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What Legal Authority Does the Fed Need During a Financial Crisis? 
 
Eric A. Posner1 
 
January 22, 2016 
 
 
Abstract. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 exposed gaps in the law that authorizes 
federal agencies to provide emergency liquidity support. This essay describes the ways in 
which legal constraints hampered response to the crisis, proposes reforms that would 
make possible a unified and strong response, and criticizes the Dodd-Frank Act for 
weakening, rather than strengthening, the crisis-response agencies. 
 
 
 During the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the government sought to use aggressive 
measures to unfreeze the credit markets, but found itself repeatedly blocked by the law. Officials 
reacted to their legal problems in different ways. During the collapse of Lehman, the Fed refused 
to issue an emergency loan because of legal hurdles. However, in the cases of Bear and AIG, the 
Fed violated the law or interpreted it in an extremely narrow way, rather than refrain from the 
emergency actions that events called for. The Fed and Treasury relied on additional questionable 
legal interpretations for the numerous credit facilities that they established, and in the bailouts of 
Freddie Mae, Freddie Mac, General Motors, and Chrysler. In many cases, the agencies evaded 
the law by engaging in elaborate legal maneuvers that obfuscated their actions. When the Fed 
and Treasury sought additional legal authority from Congress, Congress initially refused, causing 
one of the most dangerous moments during the crisis. 
 
At the same time, the mainstream view is that most of the government’s actions were 
good policy. They put an end to a massive liquidity crisis—the worst since the Great Depression, 
possibly the worst in U.S. history—and spared the country an even more severe downturn than 
the Great Recession of 2007-2009. Moreover, the failure to rescue Lehman—law or no law—
was the Fed’s biggest mistake: the collapse of Lehman introduced the most acute phase of the 
financial crisis, which until that point seemed manageable. The mismatch between law and 
policy raises numerous questions. Should the law be updated to permit the policy interventions 
that the government felt it needed to use? If so, how exactly should the law be changed? 
 
 It is possible to argue that the law makes little difference. The agencies and their leaders 
did not pay a price for their legal violations during the crisis; next time around, they may 
disregard the law again.2 But it is clearly better if the Fed acts lawfully than if it acts illegally. 
The legal restrictions were not costless. They caused the Fed to act more cautiously than it 
should have, and have allowed officials to blame their costly failure to rescue Lehman Brothers 
                                                 
1 Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished Service Professor and Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair, University of 
Chicago Law School. Thanks to participants at a workshop at the University of Chicago Law School for comments, 
and to Ethel Amponsah and Hannah Waldman for research assistance. 
2 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (2010); cf. Philip A. 
Wallach, To The Edge: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Responses to the 2008 Financial Crisis (2015) (arguing that 
the Fed’s major constraint was that of maintaining legitimacy rather than legality, though the two were related). 
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in September 2008 on legal constraints and hence to duck criticism of their judgment. The law 
also forced the Fed and Treasury to structure straightforward transactions—loans and asset 
purchases—in complex ways, which reduced transparency, increased cost, and produced 
unintended consequences. The law was also responsible for the division of authority between 
different agencies—the Fed, Treasury, FDIC, the SEC, and others—and their disagreements 
during the crisis led to delay and coordination failures. Finally, the government’s legal violations 
have generated expensive and time-consuming litigation, which may ultimately force the 
government to pay tens of billions of dollars to shareholders.3 
 
 In this Essay, I describe how the law needs to be updated in order to provide government 
agencies with the legal authority they need in order to resolve a financial crisis. I begin in Part I 
with a description of the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) function. It has been understood since the 
nineteenth century that central banks must intervene during a financial crisis by making 
emergency loans to financial institutions and possibly the broader market as well. This 
understanding was embodied in law in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, which authorizes the 
Fed to make emergency loans during a financial crisis.4 
 
 However, the statute, while broadly worded, contains a number of restrictions that would 
impede the response to the financial crisis in 2007-2009. Moreover, the complex regulatory 
regime gave certain crisis-related authorities to institutions other than the Fed, including FDIC, 
the SEC, and Treasury. Meanwhile, the financial system changed enormously from 1913 to 
today, with much of the crucial changes taking place only over the last 20 years, in ways that 
were not adequately understood.5 The Fed’s focus has always been on the banking system, 
whose traditional function was to convert short-term lending into long-term lending. That 
function was partially taken over by the so-called shadow banking system toward the end of the 
twentieth century—which consists of investment banks, insurance companies, and other non-
bank financial institutions. It was in the shadow banking system that the financial crisis 
originated, and the mismatch between the law and the response reflected in part the law’s focus 
on the banking system. 
 
 Part II summarizes the consequences of the mismatch. As the crisis unfolded, 
policymakers realized that they needed to engage in numerous actions that did not fall 
comfortably within the confines of the law. The law authorized secured loans. The crisis required 
the government to issue loans that could not be fully secured; to buy assets; and to acquire 
equity. Underlying the law was a crucial principle, which guided the Fed’s conduct: that the Fed 
should not engage in “fiscal” activities. This means that the Fed should make loans only when it 
was confident it could be repaid; it should not enter transactions that could cause a loss borne by 
taxpayers. As I will argue, this principle as well as the law itself significantly hampered the Fed’s 
response. 
 
 Part III draws out implications for the law and for administrative structure. I argue that 
the LLR needs more powers than it currently has—including the power to make unsecured loans, 
                                                 
3 See David Zaring, Litigating the Financial Crisis, 100 Va. L. Rev. 1405 (2014). 
4 Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 226 (2006). 
5 For a discussion, see Gary B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming 
(2012) (on the rise of shadow banking). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2723524 
3 
 
buy assets, including equity; to take predictable losses; to seize control of financial institutions; 
and to regulate market transactions. I also argue that the LLR function should be centralized in a 
single, independent agency—most plausibly, the Fed itself. Unfortunately, in the Dodd-Frank 
Act6 Congress moved in the opposite direction, weakening rather than strengthening the LLR. 
 
 A number of commentators argue that the financial crisis was caused by government 
meddling, and exacerbated by the perception that the government would bail out firms that 
failed.7 These commentators argue that the Fed’s LLR function should be restricted or 
eliminated.8 While I disagree with this view, it is not my purpose to criticize it. Instead, my goal 
is to assume that the mainstream view that the Fed acted properly during the financial crisis by 
lending widely is correct, and examine what reforms are necessary to supply it with the proper 
legal authority. 
 
I. Background on the Lender of Last Resort 
 
A. Liquidity Crises 
 
 The principles governing the LLR were most famously articulated by the British 
journalist Walter Bagehot in his book, Lombard Street, which was published in 1873.9 Although 
Bagehot was not the first person to identify these principles, he is routinely cited by central 
bankers, and we will do the same.10 According to Bagehot, during a liquidity crisis, the central 
bank should (1) lend as widely as possible, (2) against good collateral, (3) at a high rate of 
interest.11 
 
 A liquidity crisis occurs when banks and other lenders stop (or greatly reduce) lending to 
other firms even though those firms are solvent and would normally have no trouble repaying 
loans. Up until the financial crisis of 2007-2009, a liquidity crisis would normally start with a 
bank run or panic. In a bank run, depositors withdraw money from a bank because they worry 
that the bank is insolvent and so will not have funds to pay them in the future. As depositors 
withdraw money, the bank needs to raise cash by selling its assets, including illiquid assets that it 
must sell at a discount—at fire-sale prices. Because the bank receives less for the assets than 
their fundamental value, the bank can be driven into actual insolvency even if it was not 
insolvent before. The crucial feature of a classic bank run is that the bank starts off as solvent—
those who worry about its solvency are wrong—but then ends up insolvent because of the mass 
withdrawal of funds along with fire sales.12 
                                                 
6 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
7 See, e.g., John Taylor, The Financial Crisis and the Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of What Went 
Wrong (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14631, 2009), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14631.pdf.  
8 See, e.g., George Selgin, The Courage to Refuse, Alt-M (Oct. 31, 2015), http://www.alt-
m.org/2015/10/31/courage-to-refuse/.  
9 Walter Bagehot, Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market (1873). 
10 Credit for originating the principles is usually given to Henry Thornton, a British banker and politician, who died 
in 1815. See C.A.E. Goodhart, The Changing Role of Central Banks, 18 Fin. Hist. Rev. 135 (2011). 
11 Bagehot, supra note __, at 196-97. 
12 For the classic analysis, see Douglas Diamond & Philip Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 
J. Pol. Econ. 401 (1983). 
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 A run on a single bank can spread rapidly to other banks. This contagion can occur along 
many pathways. Banks lend money to each other in order to facilitate check-clearing and other 
aspects of the payment system, and to obtain interest on funds that are not currently needed for 
customers. If one bank fails, then it cannot repay other banks that have deposits with it, which 
can cause the failure of those other banks as well. Another pathway occurs through fire sales. If a 
run forces one bank to sell its home mortgage loans in fire sales, then the price of home 
mortgage loans will decline. This means that other banks that own home mortgage loans may 
suffer losses, alarming depositors who withdraw funds; this in turn forces the bank to sell 
additional mortgage loans in order to raise cash, driving the price down even farther, in a 
downward spiral. Numerous well-managed banks with mortgage loans on their books may be 
driven into insolvency. 
 
 The essential feature of a liquidity crisis is that solvent banks become insolvent not 
because of bad loans or investments but because of the withdrawal of liquidity. The withdrawal 
of liquidity could be driven by misunderstanding as in our example, but also by random events 
and economic conditions that cause people to start hoarding cash. The ultimate source of this 
fragility is the role of banks as financial intermediators. They obtain most of their funds from 
short-term loans (deposits, which can be withdrawn at any time) and then lend those funds for 
long periods, like the thirty years of a typical home mortgage. The business model of banks 
assumes that depositors will, on average, keep most of their funds in the bank, and that as some 
customers withdraw their funds, those funds are replaced by deposits by other customers, so that 
the bank has a permanent pool of funds that it can lend out for a long term. If a run occurs, this 
model is undermined.13 
 
 As we learned during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, runs can originate outside the 
banking system. For example, in the repo market a firm like an investment bank or hedge fund 
raises capital by selling securities to another firm—such as a pension fund or insurance 
company—and promising to buy them back at a slightly higher price in a day or two. The 
transaction is functionally identical to a secured loan—the seller obtains funds and then pays 
them back, with the securities serving as collateral. The two parties typically roll over the loan 
for long periods, with the result that the transaction approximates a demand deposit. At the onset 
of the crisis, mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other mortgage-derived securities served as 
collateral in many of these transactions.14 As mortgage default rates rose, the MBSs traded at 
lower prices, and firms lost confidence in their ability to value them accurately. The lenders in 
the repo market responded by imposing larger haircuts on the collateral—meaning that the 
borrowers were required to supply additional MBSs in order to continue borrowing. When 
borrowers ran out of collateral, they sold off assets at fire-sale prices and were driven into 
insolvency.15 
 
                                                 
13 Gorton, supra note __. 
14 Mortgage-backed securities are bonds that are secured by mortgages. I use the more general term “mortgage-
derived securities” to encompass MBSs and other securities whose value is related to mortgage payment and default 
rates, including collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which involve a more complicated transactional structure. 
15 Gorton, supra note __ at 191-92; Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel, & Dmitry Orlov, Sizing Up Repo (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17768, 2012).  
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 Financial economists are divided as to whether financial panics are caused by pure 
liquidity problems—solvent firms that cannot borrow—or also require insolvency.16 It is, of 
course, possible for a financial crisis to start because banks have made bad loans. If the loans are 
not repaid, a bank can become insolvent, causing a run as depositors rush to remove their funds, 
and harming other banks and other lenders. The S&L crisis of the 1980s was probably due to 
such bad loans. Because high interest rates increased the cost of funds for S&Ls, they were 
driven to make riskier loans for which they could charge high rates themselves.17 Deregulation 
allowed them to branch into areas of lending of which they had little experience. Overinvestment 
in commercial building created a price bubble, which destroyed the S&Ls when it burst.18 
 
 Most financial crises are likely a combination of liquidity and solvency problems. In the 
2007-2008 crisis, for example, many financial institutions failed simply because they issued too 
many subprime mortgages that defaulted, and bought too many mortgage-related securities 
which lost value because of those defaults. These firms were highly leveraged and overexposed 
to the real estate market. The defaults indicated that the fundamental value of the assets was very 
low, in aggregate lower than the value of the firms’ liabilities. These firms were economically 
insolvent. However, many of the firms that suffered from withdrawal of credit were well-
managed, not excessively leveraged, and not excessively exposed to real estate. Lenders stopped 
lending to them because the lenders needed to hoard cash in order to protect themselves from 
runs, not because the lenders believed that the firms were insolvent. While the temporary decline 
in the market price of the assets caused by the withdrawal of liquidity made the firms appear 
insolvent, they were solvent in the fundamental-value or economic sense. 
 
 Financial crises are extreme events. They can introduce political turmoil and overthrow 
governments. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 followed this pattern by engendering the Tea 
Party and Occupy Wall Street, political polarization, and pervasive distrust of government.19 The 
immediate economic problem they cause is more complex. In principle, the failure of financial 
institutions could be self-contained, producing no harm to anyone other than the shareholders, 
creditors, and employees of the firms that collapse. However, economists have shown that 
financial crises almost always lead to significant recessions.20 The leading explanation is that 
banks and other financial institutions add value through the relationships they develop with 
borrowers; when the lenders collapse, the relationship-specific information is lost.21 Another 
explanation is that the sudden withdrawal of credit from the “real” economy forces businesses to 
lay off workers, sell inventories at fire-sale prices, and so on, leading to further downward spirals 
that disrupt existing commercial relationships.22 The financial crisis of 2007-2008 caused the 
Great Recession of 2007-2009, in which all of these disruptions were visible. 
                                                 
16 For a discussion, see Itay Goldstein & Ady Pauzner, Review of Theories of Financial Crises (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18670, 2012). 
17 See Lawrence White, The S&L Debacle: Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation (1992). 
18 Id. 
19 See Atif Mian et al., Resolving Debt Overhang: Political Constraints in the Aftermath of the Financial Crisis 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17831, 2012). 
20 Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 573 (2010). 
21 Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary effects of the financial crisis in the propagation of the Great 
Depression, 73 Am. Econ. Rev. 257 (1983). 
22 For discussions of these and other views, see Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 
Handbook of the Economics of Finance (G. M. Constantinides et al., eds. 2003); Moritz Schularick and Alan M. 
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B. The LLR’s Response to a Liquidity Crisis 
 
 Conventional wisdom, as embodied in the Bagehot dictum, is that the LLR—typically, 
the central bank—should lend freely during a liquidity crisis against good collateral.23 The 
function of the LLR is to avoid bankruptcy—and sale of assets at fire-sale prices—of firms that 
are economically solvent. The LLR is not supposed to rescue insolvent firms, which should be 
wound down in bankruptcy and deserve to be liquidated because they were mismanaged, and are 
worth more in pieces than as going concerns. 
 
 The three elements of the Bagehot approach are thought to advance this goal. First, the 
LLR should lend freely, that is, to as many solvent firms as possible, because it needs to replace 
the withdrawal of credit from the economy by private creditors. The LLR should not limit itself 
to large or “too-big-to-fail” institutions, nor to banks. A liquidity crisis affects everyone, and can 
lead everyone to sell off assets at fire-sale prices, which causes spiraling harm. The extension of 
credit by the LLR allows all firms to hold assets until maturity or until the credit market 
recovers. When fire sales stop and asset values recover, the crisis ends, and the LLR should 
withdraw credit. 
 
 Second, the LLR should lend against good collateral because it cannot afford to lose 
money. In Bagehot’s time, the Bank of England was a (mostly) private institution. If it loaned 
vast sums of money and then was not repaid, it would go bankrupt itself. While it was in the 
Bank of England’s interest to rescue the financial system (so it could continue lending), it was by 
definition not in its interest to risk its own existence.24 Modern central banks are public 
institutions, but this principle has been preserved under the theory that central banks should not 
take risks with taxpayers’ money which is the domain of the fiscal authority—Congress and 
Treasury. If central banks do not lend against good collateral, and are not paid back, the taxpayer 
must make up for the loss. The good collateral requirement just means that the credit risk 
incurred by the central bank should be as low as possible. 
 
 Third, the LLR should charge “a very high rate” of interest, or a “penalty” rate, in order 
to combat perverse incentive created by its own existence. LLR payoffs are a kind of insurance 
for financial institutions, and all types of insurance create moral hazard by protecting firms from 
downside risk. To combat moral hazard, the LLR charges a high interests rate, which means that 
the firm that receives an emergency loan is not fully insured but only partially insured, much as a 
person with homeowner or auto insurance must pay a deductible. Partial insurance in all these 
cases provides the insured entity with an incentive to take care ex ante. The penalty rate also 
encourages borrowers to return to the private market as soon as it recovers. It is important to 
understand that the penalty rate is not very high. It must be lower than the high rate of interest 
that prevails during the crisis; otherwise, it will not solve the liquidity crisis. Typically, a penalty 
                                                                                                                                                             
Taylor, Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870–2008, 102 Amer. 
Econ. Rev. 1029 (2012). 
23 For a discussion and survey, see Dietrich Domanski, Richhild Moessner, & William Nelson, Central banks as 
Lender of Last Resort: Experiences During the 2007-2010 Crisis and Lessons for the Future, (Fed. Reserve Bd. 
Working Paper No. 2014-110, 2014). 
24 C.A.E. Goodhart, The Central Bank and the Financial System 333-35 (1995). 
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rate might be just a percentage point or so higher than the rate that existed just prior to the 
crisis.25 
 
  However, while the core of the idea behind Bagehot remains intact, the principles have 
evolved to meet modern requirements. 
 
 First, central banks typically focus on the banking system rather than financial 
institutions generally. In the United States, it was thought—until the crisis—that banks played 
the most important role in financial intermediation as well as in the payments system. Other 
firms could be allowed to fail; banks could not. This idea was embodied in the Federal Reserve 
Act, which authorizes the Fed to lend to banks largely as a matter of discretion, while permitting 
it to lend to non-banks only in exigent circumstances and subject to various procedural and 
substantive constraints.26 This principle hampered the Fed’s response to the financial crisis in its 
early stages. While the Fed did eventually extend emergency loans to non-banks, it initially did 
so slowly and grudgingly.27 
 
 Second, central banks have found themselves hampered in determining whether collateral 
is “good” or not. During a liquidity crisis, assets lose their value because of the withdrawal of 
liquidity but may retain fundamental value. This means that a firm that holds an asset until the 
crisis ends will be able to sell it for more than the market price during the crisis. In order to 
resolve a crisis, the central bank must calculate this “real” value—that is, the value of the 
discounted stream of payoffs until the maturity of the asset, on the assumption that the credit 
market eventually revives. However, it is difficult to determine how much of the price decline is 
attributable to the liquidity shortage and how much is attributable to fundamental economic 
variables. For example, during the 2007-2009 crisis, AAA CDOs lost considerable value—as 
much as 70 or 80 percent—and today are trading about 5 to 10 percent below value.28 This 
suggests that a part of the crisis-era price decline could be attributed to fundamental problems, 
that is, defaults that were not anticipated at the time that the CDOs were constructed. 
 
 Third, central banks do not usually demand penalty rates during a financial crisis.29 The 
Fed followed this pattern in the 2007-2008 crisis after briefly charging a modest penalty rate at 
the earliest stage. The problem with penalty rates is that the market interprets borrowing at a 
penalty rate as a signal of possible insolvency. A borrower will not pay above-market interest for 
a loan unless it is desperate; if it is desperate, it is likely to fail even with temporary liquidity 
support from the central bank. Creditors in the private market will therefore stop lending to it. 
This problem is acute when the financial institution in question depends on short-term loans. 
Short-term lenders can easily withdraw their funds or refuse to roll over loans, and quickly move 
their funds to a healthier institution. In this way, a financial institution that takes out an 
emergency loan from the LLR signs its own death warrant. To avoid branding emergency 
                                                 
25 Under the Fed’s current regulations, the penalty rate is 50-100 basis points above the market interest rate. See 
Federal Reserve System, Discount Window Lending, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_discount_window.htm (visited January 21, 2016). 
26 See infra. 
27 David Wessel, In Fed We Trust 147-49 (2009). 
28 Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Bear’s Lair: Index Credit Default Swaps at the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 
Rev. Fin. Stud. 3250, 3255 fig.1 (2011). 
29 Financial Stability and Central Banks: A Global Perspective 174-75 (Richard Brearley et al. eds., 2001). 
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borrowers with the stigma of possible insolvency, central banks try to encourage as many 
institutions as possible to borrow from them—and this is only possible if a low interest rate, 
rather than a penalty rate, is offered. When many financial institutions borrow from the central 
bank, none of them is stigmatized, because the weakest of them can no longer be singled out. 
 
 Moreover, there is a great deal of controversy as to whether the availability of the LLR 
does, in fact, create moral hazard.30 Financial crises are rare and unpredictable events. It is far 
from obvious how a financial institution can protect itself from a financial crisis. A firm that 
makes reckless loans will not be rescued by the LLR unless it happens to fail at the same time 
that a crisis takes place; but because crises are rare, a firm can hardly depend on such “luck.” 
Moreover, no one predicted the 2007-2008 financial crisis; accordingly, no one could have 
deliberately made reckless loans with the expectation of being bailed out. The problem was not 
that firms thought they would be rescued and so behaved recklessly; it was that they did not 
anticipate a systemic failure, and accordingly took no precautions against it. Finally, the most 
straightforward way of deterring moral hazard is not to deny firms rescue loans—which defeats 
the purpose of resolving a financial crisis—but to impose strict ex ante regulation. The Dodd-
Frank Act did just this. 
 
B. The Law 
 
 While the Fed is usually identified as the LLR in the United States, the LLR function is 
actually shared by the Fed and FDIC. Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the Fed was understood to be 
the LLR for solvent banks and non-banks. FDIC was the LLR for insolvent banks. There was no 
LLR for insolvent non-banks, which necessitated creative actions by the Fed and FDIC during 
the 2007-2009 financial crisis, and the enactment of EESA in October 2008. The Dodd-Frank 
Act corrects this omission by providing for an orderly resolution process for insolvent financial 
institutions of all types.31 
 
 The Fed’s authority to make emergency loans to banks is located in section 10B of the 
Federal Reserve Act.32 The Fed can make short-term loans; the loans must be secured by high-
quality collateral; and various procedural requirements and limits must be respected, especially if 
the bank is undercapitalized. Under current regulations, the Fed charges a penalty of 50 basis 
points above the federal funds rate for banks in “generally sound financial condition,” and an 
additional 50 basis points for weaker banks.33 This type of lending is known as discount-window 
lending.34 
                                                 
30 Compare Selgin, supra note __ (arguing that moral hazard is important), and Gorton, supra note __ (arguing that 
moral hazard is not important). For evidence from the crisis, see Philip E. Strahan & Başak Tanyeri, Once Burned, 
Twice Shy: Money Market Fund Responses to a Systemic Liquidity Shock, 50 J. Fin. Quantitative Analysis 119 
(2015) (finding evidence that bailouts did not increase moral hazard in money market mutual fund markets); Luis 
Brandao-Marques, Ricardo Correa, & Horacio Sapriza, International Evidence on Government Support and Risk 
Taking in the Banking Sector (IMF Working Paper No. 13/94, 2013) (finding evidence of moral hazard); Lamont 
Black & Lieu Hazelwood, The Effect of TARP on Bank Risk-Taking, 9 J. Fin. Stability 790 (2013) (same). 
31 See infra Part III.C. 
32 12 U.S.C. § 347(b). 
33 Federal Reserve, Regulatory Reform: Discount Window Lending,  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_discount_window.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2015). 
34 Id. 
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 The Fed may make loans to non-banks under section 13(3).35 This section requires the 
Fed to jump some significant procedural hurdles. The Fed must determine that “unusual and 
exigent circumstances” exist, and the Board of Governors must hold a vote with approval of a 
supermajority of five members. The Fed must also determine that borrowers are “unable to 
secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.” Dodd-Frank added an 
additional requirement that loans be made through a “program or facility with broad-based 
eligibility,” meaning that the Fed must set out in advance eligibility requirements rather than 
pick and choose among borrowers. The loan must also be “secured to the satisfaction of the 
Federal Reserve bank.” 
 
 Together, these two sections were thought to implement Bagehot’s dictum. The Fed can 
lend broadly—to banks and non-banks—in an emergency, and must be fully secured. The 
statutes leave the Fed discretion as to how much to charge, allowing the Fed to charge a penalty 
rate if it wants to. 
 
 FDIC is given the power to wind down banks that are undercapitalized or have failed. In 
normal cases, FDIC pays off insured depositors from its insurance fund, but otherwise creditors 
are not protected, and share in the proceeds of the sale of the bank’s assets according to priority, 
and pro rata, as in a normal bankruptcy. In such cases, FDIC is required to minimize the cost to 
the insurance fund—which means paying only those creditors (mainly, depositors) covered by 
it.36 However, the law makes an exception where a bank’s failure “would have serious adverse 
effects on economic conditions or financial stability.”37 With the concurrence of the Secretary of 
the Treasury, a two-thirds majority of the Federal Reserve Board, and a two-thirds majority of 
the FDIC Board of Directors, FDIC may pay off creditors of the bank in question. FDIC’s role as 
LLR thus has two components. The routine payoff of insured bank depositors, and the power to 
compensate other bank creditors in emergency circumstances.  
 
 This leaves a significant gap: the large non-bank financial institution that faces solvency 
(rather than merely liquidity) problems. Before Dodd-Frank, FDIC had no jurisdiction over 
nonbanks, while the Fed could lend to them only if they had collateral. During the crisis, the Fed 
and FDIC engaged in significant legal maneuvering in order to address this type of institution, as 
we will now discuss. 
 
II. The Fed’s Struggles with the Law during the Financial Crisis 
 
 The financial crisis is usually dated to the summer of 2007, when the TED spread—a 
measure of the cost of short-term lending among large banks—spiked.38 Until that time, the TED 
spread had remained very low, indicating that large banks trusted each other enough to lend to 
each other at barely above the Treasury rate. In August 9, 2007, BNP Paribas, a French bank, 
froze redemptions from three investment funds that held subprime mortgage-related assets which 
                                                 
35 12. U.S.C. § 343(A). 
36 12 U.S.C. § 1821(f). 
37 12 U.S.C. §1823(c)(4)(G). 
38 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. Econ. Persp. 77, 85-86 
(2009). 
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could no longer be valued.39 The TED spread remained elevated through the end of 2007 and the 
first eight months of 2008. The crisis entered its acute phase after the collapse of Lehman on 
September 15. The government’s most aggressive interventions took place during the remaining 
months of 2008 and the first six months of 2009.40 In the summer of 2009, the TED spread 
returned to its historical level, indicating that the crisis was over.  
 
A. Acting Within its Authority 
 
 The Fed’s initial responses to the financial crisis occurred after the BNP Paribas 
announcement, and in this initial phase, the Fed used traditional instruments that were well 
within its statutory powers. On August 10, 2007, the Fed lowered the interest rate for discount-
window loans and extended the term of those loans.41 The Fed’s authority to make loans to 
banks that are temporarily in need of liquidity is codified in section 10B of the Federal Reserve 
Act.42 In September of 2007, the Fed lowered its target federal funds rate from 5.25% to 4.75%. 
The Fed would continue lowering the interest rate during the crisis, reaching 0-0.25% in 
December 2008.43 The Fed’s authority to adjust the target federal funds rate by trading securities 
on the open market is codified in section 14 of the Federal Reserve Act.44 No one questioned the 
Fed’s legal authority to engage in these actions.45 
 
 However, these actions were insufficient. Banks are reluctant to borrow from the discount 
window because of stigma. Although the loans are nominally secret, analysts and other market 
actors can discover whether banks took emergency loans simply by asking bank executives and 
inferring a “yes” if no answer is provided.46 The Fed sets the interest rate for emergency lending 
above the market rate in order to encourage banks to use the market if they can. But this means 
that a bank that takes an emergency loan from the Fed cannot obtain loans from the market, 
which indicates that it might fail at any time. As a result, potential investors and lenders may be 
reluctant to put money in the bank, hastening its demise. Nonetheless, the Fed made 26,395 loans 
from the discount window, totaling almost $11 trillion, during the crisis (August 2007 to 
December 2009).47 In December 2007, the Fed tried to mitigate the stigma effect of discount 
window lending by auctioning off the emergency loans rather than setting an arbitrarily high 
                                                 
39 The Banking Crisis Handbook 49-50 (Greg N. Gregoriou, ed., 1st ed. 2010) 
40 There are many narratives of the government’s response to the financial crisis, including popular books and 
academic works. See, e.g., David Wessel, In Fed We Trust; Alan S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped; Kroszner & 
Melick, The Response of the Federal Reserve to the Recent Banking and Financial Crisis. 
41 Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Aug 17, 2007), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20070817a.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2015).  
42 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a). 
43 For data, see Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Economic Research, Effective Federal Funds Rate, 
https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FEDFUNDS.  
44 12 U.S.C. § 353. 
45 The Fed’s discount-window lending appears to have satisfied other legal requirements, including collateral 
requirements. See R. Alton Gilbert et al., Federal Reserve Lending to Troubled Banks During the Financial Crisis, 
2007-10 (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2012-006A, 2012). 
46 Domanksi et al., supra note __, at 10-11. 
47 Allen N. Berger et al., The Federal Reserve’s Discount Window and TAF Programs: “Pushing on a String?” 
(unpub. m.s. 2015), at 39. 
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price for them. The Term Auction Facility (TAF),48 as the program was called, resulted in an 
additional 3,937 loans, totaling $3.7 trillion.49 While these programs did increase bank lending,50 
they did not unfreeze the credit market. Indeed, major banks preferred to increase their liquidity 
by borrowing from Federal Home Loan Banks—whose emergency lending powers were 
apparently off the radar screen—and attracting insured deposits.51 
 
 The lowering of interest rates also failed to end the crisis. In theory, by lowering rates the 
Fed reduces the cost of funds for banks and increases their incentive to lend. Home buyers can 
take advantage of low interest rates to obtain affordable mortgages, and existing homeowners 
can refinance their mortgages, providing them with additional cash to buys goods and services. 
However, the mechanism through which lower rates lead to greater lending had broken down. 
The financial crisis was caused by uncertainty about the value of mortgage-related assets owned 
by banks and other creditors. Banks and other financial institutions stopped lending because they 
could not determine the value of mortgage-related assets offered as collateral and the credit risk 
of borrowers that owned great quantities of mortgage-related assets. Fire sales of mortgage-
related assets caused a collapse in their prices, which rendered many creditors insolvent based on 
market values, and so unable to lend, borrow, or raise capital. The modestly increased incentive, 
if any, to make loans encouraged by the interest-rate cuts could not offset these massive risks. 
Moreover, as creditors realized that they could have trouble borrowing money, they hoarded cash 
rather than lent it out, so that they could repay their creditors or pay their expenses if further 
credit was not forthcoming. Home buyers and homeowners could not take advantage of low 
interest rates because creditors stopped lending.52 
 
 The more fundamental problem was that the source of the crisis lay outside traditional 
bank activities, in the shadow banking system. Most banks did not suffer from runs; deposit 
insurance and perhaps the discount window and related sources of support from the Fed 
reassured depositors.53 Runs occurred in the repo market, affecting investment banks, pensions, 
insurance companies, hedge funds, and other non-bank institutions. These institutions could not 
access the discount window or TAF. They might have been helped indirectly by the reduction in 
interest rates if banks had been willing to lend to them, but banks were reluctant to lend to them 
because the banks could not be sure that the borrowers were solvent. 
 
 To address the problems in the shadow banking system, the Fed was forced to draw on its 
authority under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which at the time (it has since been 
amended54) allowed the Fed to make emergency loans to “individuals, partnerships, and 
corporations”—in other words, people and institutions other than banks—“in unusual and 
                                                 
48 Report to the Secretary of the Treasury from the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee of the Securities 
Industry and Financial Markets Association (July 30, 2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp1094.aspx (last visited Nov. 27, 2015). 
49 Berger et al., supra at 39. 
50 Berger et al., supra at 39. 
51 Adam Ashcraft, Morten Bech, & Scott Frame, The Federal Home Loan Bank System: The 
Lender of Next-to-Last Resort? 42 J. Money Credit & Banking 551 (2010). 
52 Gorton, supra note __, at 186-94. 
53 Sheila Bair, Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from Itself 292-93 
(2012). 
54 The amendments are discussed infra. 
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exigent circumstances.” A supermajority of the members of the Board of Governors was needed 
to authorize these loans, and the loans must be “secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve 
bank” that makes the loan. The Fed had not made a loan under 13(3) since the Great Depression, 
and Fed officials were reluctant to use this law at first.55 But the law is the law, and many of the 
Fed’s actions under 13(3) were clearly lawful. 
 
 For example, on March 11, 2008, the Fed created the Term Securities Lending Facility 
(TSLF), through which the Fed loaned Treasury securities to primary dealers (major investment 
banks) that posted collateral.56 By this time, it was clear that “unusual and exigent 
circumstances” existed—a major collapse of the credit markets. The loans were made against 
collateral already used in the repo market, including investment-grade corporate bonds and 
mortgage-backed securities. On March 17, the Fed supplemented the TSLF with the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), through which primary dealers could obtain short-term cash loans 
by posting the same types of collateral.57 The PDCF was also legally straightforward—although 
as we will discuss in the next section, some questions arise as to the quality of the collateral that 
the Fed accepted. 
 
 However, while firms borrowed trillions of dollars through the TSLF and PDCF, the 
facilities failed to resolve the crisis.58 The rescue of Bear Stearns, also in March 2008, was 
probably a more important intervention at the time, since it indicated—or seemed to indicate—
that the Fed would not allow a major financial institution to fail. As I will discuss below, the 
Bear Stearns rescue was legally questionable. By contrast, the TSLF and the PDCF were hardly 
used throughout the crisis other than during its acute phase in September 2008.59 Investment 
banks feared stigma in the same way that commercial banks feared the stigma of the discount 
window. The Fed’s legal authorities were inadequate for resolving the crisis. 
 
B. Stretching the Limits of its Authority and Violating the Law 
 
 In March 2007, a run began against Bear Stearns. Bear was a large investment bank and 
primary dealer, which borrowed heavily on the repo market. Its creditors lost confidence in Bear 
and refused to roll over the loans.60 On March 13, Bear warned Fed officials that it would file for 
bankruptcy the next day unless the Fed loaned it money. Fearing a systemic failure, the Fed 
authorized a $12.9 billion bridge loan to Bear Stearns against $13.8 billion in collateral.61 The 
loan bought time which Bear used to find a purchaser. Merger negotiations between JP Morgan 
and Bear commenced. In the final transaction, which was consummated on March 24, the Fed 
created a special purpose vehicle called Maiden Lane, which was financed from a $28.82 billion 
loan from the Fed and a $1.15 billion subordinated loan from JP Morgan. The Fed was given the 
                                                 
55 Ben S. Bernanke, The Courage to Act: A Memoir of a Crisis and its Aftermath 205-06 (2015).  
56 Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy: Term Securities Lending Facility, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/tslf.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2015). 
57 Federal Reserve, Regulatory Reform: Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_pdcf.htm (last visited Dec. 24, 2015). 
58 The data are available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_tslf.htm#data.  
59 See Fed data. 
60 My account follows GAO, pp. 22-26, 178-84. 
61 The loan was routed through JP Morgan, but the Fed recognized that the loan was functionally a loan to Bear. 
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“residual interest,”62 meaning the equity, in the assets. Maiden Lane purchased various toxic 
assets from Bear, including agency MBSs, commercial and residential loans, non-agency 
residential MBSs, and other derivatives. 
 
 Under these terms, JP Morgan and the Fed shared the downside. If the value of the assets 
declined up to $1.15 billion, JP Morgan would absorb the entire loss; if it declined more, then the 
Fed would absorb the residual loss up to $28.82 billion. The Fed alone benefited from the upside. 
If the assets were sold for more than $30 billion, then JP Morgan and the Fed would be paid off 
in full, and the Fed would receive the residual. As it turned out, the assets appreciated, and the 
Fed earned a profit. 
 
 The Fed invoked section 13(3) for this transaction with little explanation. The theory was 
apparently that the transaction was secured to the Fed’s satisfaction, and that the loan was 
directed to a non-bank in unusual and exigent circumstances, as 13(3) permitted. This argument 
could certainly be used to justify the initial bridge loan—assuming that Bear’s collateral actually 
was adequate, for which there is no evidence one way or the other. However, the Maiden Lane 
transaction was less clearly lawful. 
 
 The Fed does not have the authority to buy assets other than Treasury securities and a few 
other types of assets used in open-market operations.63 If the Fed had simply purchased MBSs 
and the other toxic assets for $30 billion, it would have violated the law. The transaction was 
structured to avoid this type of blatant illegality. Instead of buying assets, the Fed made a secured 
loan to Maiden Lane, which then paid the Fed back. A secured loan falls more comfortably into 
the Fed’s 13(3) authority. 
 
 The problem with this approach is that the transaction provided that the value of the 
Fed’s interest would be tightly connected to the value of the underlying assets. If the assets fell in 
value by as little as 4%, the Fed would lose money. If the assets rose in value, the Fed would 
receive the entire gain. By contrast, in a secured loan—and especially a loan secured by “good,” 
that is, high-quality collateral, in Bagehot’s sense—the lender bears very little to no risk from the 
fluctuation of asset values. Functionally, the Maiden Lane transaction was a sale of assets, not a 
secured loan.64 
 
 The Fed’s rescue of AIG in September 2105 faced similar obstacles, forcing the Fed to 
evade the law yet again. It created two new SPVs—Maiden Lane II, which purchased MBSs and 
related assets from AIG’s insurance subsidiaries, and Maiden Lane III, which purchased CDOs 
from AIG’s counterparties. In both cases, the Fed shared the downside with AIG and was given a 
majority share of the profits—that is, equity. These two transactions were legally dubious in the 
same way that the Maiden Lane I transaction was. 
                                                 
62 Execution Copy- Summary of Terms and Conditions (March 28, 2008) 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2008/Contract.pdf.  
63 12 U.S.C. § 353. 
64 For similar arguments, see Thomas Porter, The Federal Reserve’s Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of the 
Federal Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. Banking Inst. 483 available at 
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/journals/articles/85.pdf; Alexander Mehra, Legal Authority in Unusual and 
Exigent Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis, 13 U. Penn. J. Bus. Law 221, 236 (2011). For 
a summary of the (negative) response from legal commentators, see Wallach, supra note __, at 53-54. 
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 Another aspect of the AIG rescue was legally questionable. In the initial transaction, the 
Fed loaned $85 billion to AIG secured by all its assets and, in addition to charging interest and 
fees, the Fed took nearly 80 percent of AIG’s equity. The equity was put into a trust whose 
beneficiary was Treasury. A court later held that the transaction violated the law because section 
13(3) does not give the Fed the authority to take equity in return for a loan.65 
 
  In fall of 2008, the Fed opened additional credit facilities. To stop a run on money 
market mutual funds, the Fed opened the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) and the Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
(MMIF).66 It also opened the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) and the Term Asset-
Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF).67 All of these facilities formally made “loans,” 
consistent with section 13(3) and the Fed’s other authorities. But, other than TALF,68 they all 
raised legal problems. 
 
 Through the AMLF, the Fed made nonrecourse loans to banks, which in turn used the 
money to buy asset-backed commercial paper from money market mutual funds.69 The banks 
used the asset-backed commercial paper as collateral for the Fed loans. Thus, formally the Fed 
made secured loans to banks, though, perhaps in recognition that the ultimate beneficiaries were 
non-banks, the Fed cited its section 13(3) authority. Functionally, the banks were used as 
conduits through which the Fed quasi-purchased the asset-backed commercial paper. If 
commercial paper dropped in value, the Fed would be left holding the collateral, with no 
recourse against the banks. So, just like in a sale, the Fed bore the risk of the decline of asset 
values. Unlike a sale, the Fed did not have a share of the upside, but would be required to return 
the collateral to the banks if they repaid the loans. The MMMIF complemented the AMLF by 
enabling money market mutual funds to sell other types of short-term debt instruments, including 
unsecured commercial paper.70 A more complicated structure, involving SPVs, protected the Fed 
from more of the downside, but did not cure the legal infirmities. 
 
 In the case of the CPFF, the veil was dropped. The Fed set up a special purpose vehicle 
called CPFF LC, which purchased commercial paper, both secured and unsecured, directly from 
issuers.71 The Fed funded CPFF LCC with secured loans. Accordingly, the risk of any variation 
in asset values—up or down—would be borne by the Fed. This could be viewed simply as a 
purchase of assets (the commercial paper) or, indirectly, an unsecured loan to the issuers, in 
                                                 
65 Starr Int’l Co., Inc. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 466 (2015). Disclosure: I worked on this case for the 
plaintiff. 
66 Federal Reserve, Regulatory Reform: Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_amlf.htm; Federal Reserve, Monetary Policy: Money 
Market Investor Funding Facility http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mmiff.htm  (last visited Dec. 24, 
2015). 
67 Federal Reserve, Regulatory Reform: Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_cpff.htm  (Last visited Dec. 24, 2015).  
68 Through TALF, the Fed effectively made loans to businesses, which were secured by various securities, consistent 
with section 13(3). For a description of the program, see GAO, supra note __, at Appendix XII. 
69 GAO, supra, at pp. 28-29 and Appendix II. 
70 GAO, supra, appendix X. 
71 GAO, supra, appendix VII. 
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either case in violation of the law, which does not authorize asset purchases and requires all 
loans to be secured.72 
 
 The Fed’s legal division made two arguments that the CPFF was lawful.73 First, it argued 
that the recipient of the loan was CPFF LC, and that the loan was secured by the commercial 
paper owned by CPFF LC. Accordingly, the transaction was a loan secured to the satisfaction of 
the Fed. However, this argument is specious as it would allow the Fed to make an unsecured loan 
to anyone simply by creating an SPV. Imagine, for example, that the Fed would like to make an 
unsecured loan to Joe Shmo, who has no assets. Following the legal division’s advice, the Fed 
could create an SPV called Shmo LC. Shmo LC would then lend money to Joe, and in return 
receive an unsecured note from him, that is, an IOU. Shmo LC would get its money from the 
Fed, which would make a section 13(3) loan to Shmo LC secured by Shmo’s note. Functionally, 
this is an unsecured loan to Schmo. If he defaults on the loan from Shmo LC, Shmo LC would 
have no money to repay the Fed, and the collateral—Shmo’s note—would be worthless. 
 
 One could argue that the relevant language in 13(3), “secured to the satisfaction of the 
Federal Reserve bank,” just means that the Fed must jump through the legal hoops of filing 
notice of a security interest, and can take a security interest in whatever it wants, such as the cash 
it advances to the borrower, and the proceeds (if any) from the borrower’s use of that cash. The 
Fed has never made this argument, as I far as I know. The reason is most likely that the Fed, 
Congress, and all other relevant actors have always understood section 13(3) to implement 
Bagehot, which requires “real” security—in the sense of collateral that would render the loan 
riskless or close to that, based on (good-faith) predictions of post-crisis collateral values. Note 
that if the Fed did believe that it could make unsecured loans, its claim that a Lehman rescue was 
illegal would be impossible to defend.74 
 
 The Fed’s legal division made a second argument in defense of the CPFF, which 
accepted unsecured (and undersecured) commercial paper. It argued that that Fed could deem the 
loan “secured to its satisfaction” because in these cases the issuer was charged an “insurance fee” 
of 100 basis points.75 The insurance fee was in essence a premium, which, multiplied by the 
number of borrowers, created an “insurance fund” that could be used to pay the Fed if borrowers 
defaulted. 
 
 This argument is also exceedingly questionable. The legal division simply redescribes an 
unsecured loan as a secured loan. To see why, note that every unsecured loan—in private 
markets as well as Fed loans—carries with it an interest rate that it is higher than the interest rate 
of a secured loan, all else equal. This “premium” can be described as an insurance fee if you 
want: the point of it is to compensate the borrower for the extra risk that results from the absence 
of collateral. A private bank makes hundreds of unsecured loans; it can certainly claim, if the 
                                                 
72 See Mehra, supra note __, at 244-45; Wallach, supra note __, at 94-96. 
73 See Federal Reserve Board, Legal Division, Authority of the Federal Reserve to Provide Extensions of Credit in 
Connection with a Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) (March 9, 2009), available at http://fcic-
static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-docs/2009-03-
09_Federal_Reserve_Bank_Letter_from_Legal_Division_to_Files_Re_Authority_of_the_Federal_Reserve_to_provi
de_extensions_of_credit_in_connection_with_a_commercial_paper_funding_facility_CPFF.pdf. 
74 See infra. 
75 Id. at 7. 
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Fed’s reasoning is correct, that the high interest rate is a “premium,” and so goes into an 
“insurance fund” that can be used to compensate the bank if borrowers default. If this logic is 
accepted, every unsecured loan is actually a secured loan. Try telling that to your bank examiner 
(who may well be the Fed itself)! 
 
C. Prevented from Taking Necessary Actions 
 
 Despite their elastic interpretations of the law, government officials—including 
Bernanke, Paulson, and Geithner—claimed that legal restrictions prevented the Fed from 
rescuing Lehman.76 They argue that Lehman, unlike Bear and other institutions, was insolvent, 
and accordingly could not be saved under section 13(3). 
 
 This claim has engendered great controversy. First, section 13(3) does not require that the 
borrower be solvent; it requires that loans be secured. Up until Lehman’s bankruptcy, the Fed 
made loans to Lehman through the PDCF, including a $28 billion loan on September 15.77 The 
loans were lawful because they were backed by Lehman’s collateral. The Fed evidently felt that 
even highly dubious collateral—C rated and unrated securities—could secure the PDCF loans.78 
If the Fed was correct, it could have lawfully continued lending to Lehman, enabling the 
investment bank to pay off many of its counterparties. The Fed could also have purchased the 
securities using the SPV mechanism developed for the Bear rescue. 
 
 Moreover, the New York Times reported that lower-level officials in FRBNY believed 
that Lehman was solvent;79 so did Anton Valukas, the examiner in Lehman’s bankruptcy.80 A 
subsequent FDIC report found that Lehman was insolvent, but only barely.81 And a careful 
academic study finds that Lehman was economically solvent until the first week of September 
2008, when it started unloading its assets at crisis-driven prices.82 While FRBNY might have 
believed that it would lose money on a loan to Lehman, it could certainly have extended credit 
for a long enough period to permit an orderly wind-down. Moreover, the Fed could very likely 
have made fully secured loans to Lehman earlier in 2008, before Lehman’s assets lost value. 
Because a rescue at an earlier date would have made Lehman’s fire sales unnecessary, Lehman 
would not have been driven into (or near) insolvency by those sales. 
 
                                                 
76 Ben S. Bernanke, supra note __, at 348-50; Henry M. Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse 
of the Global Financial System 183 (2010); and Timothy F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises 
180 (2014). 
77 See Federal Reserve System, Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_pdcf.htm#data (visited on January 21, 2016). 
78 The collateral descriptions are available at the Fed’s website, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_pdcf.htm#data. They can be downloaded under the heading, 
“Data.” 
79 James B. Stewart & Peter Eavis, Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout that Never Was. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 
2014 at A1. 
80  Jenner & Block, Overview: Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. Chapter 11 Proceedings Examiner Report, available 
at https://jenner.com/lehman. 
81 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. under the 
Dodd-Frank Act 5 FDIC Q. 1 (2011). 
82 See Emily Kapur, The Next Lehman Bankruptcy (unpub. m.s. 2015). 
17 
 
 Second, contemporary evidence indicates that the major reasons for letting Lehman fail 
were political and operational rather than legal. Paulson wanted to avoid being labeled “Mr. 
Bailout”—for political, and possibly ideological reasons, he wanted to avoid another Bear-style 
bailout. Paulson and others also worried that a Lehman bailout would create moral hazard.83 At 
the same time, the Fed was prepared to provide financial assistance if Barclays agreed to 
purchase Lehman, as everyone hoped.84 It is hard to believe that Bernanke and the others would 
have facilitated a purchase if they believed that Lehman was deeply insolvent, since such a 
purchase would have damaged Barclays, one of the largest banks in the world and an even more 
important institution than Lehman. Finally, Bernanke seemed more concerned that the Fed would 
lose money on a bailout than that the bailout was illegal. As I will discuss below, a risky loan, 
even if legal, might have angered Congress and posed a threat to the Fed’s independence. 
 
 All that said, the questionable legality of a Lehman rescue provided a convenient excuse 
to government officials whose economic, political, and operational judgments were under heavy 
scrutiny. Moreover, some combination of legal and political norms must have led Bernanke to 
advise Paulson in September that the Fed’s limits had been reached, and that Congress must be 
approached.85 Bernanke may have believed that the financial crisis required the government to 
buy toxic assets, make equity investments in banks, make unsecured loans, and engage in other 
transactions that either the Fed could not engage in, or could engage in only to a limited extent. 
These considerations could have taken different forms. Perhaps marginal violations of the law 
were permissible, but wholesale violations were not. Or perhaps the Fed lacked the institutional 
capacity to rescue the entire financial system—it just did not have enough staff, experience, and 
resources. Or perhaps the Fed sought to force Congress to share the political blame for the 
unpopular bailouts. 
 
 Congress passed the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act on October 3, 2008. 
However, the legislative response was far from ideal. In its first attempt, the House of 
Representatives voted down the bill, with nearly catastrophic consequences for the financial 
system. The Dow Jones index fell eight percent. A later bill, overloaded with pork, did pass. 
There is little evidence that members of the House or Senate understood what was at stake; they 
deferred to the expertise of the agency heads. Hearings were expedited; witnesses who disagreed 
with the bills under considerations were not permitted to testify.86 Rather than resolve any of the 
policy debates, Congress gave enormous discretion to Treasury to spend hundreds of billions 
dollars as it saw fit, subject to very loose supervision. 
 
 How can we summarize the relationship between the law and the Fed’s actions? The 
overall picture is complex. The Fed arguably violated the law on several occasions, and 
flagrantly violated the law on a few occasions, but also acted as though the law put limits on 
what it could accomplish. In particular, the Fed felt constrained, on some (but not all) occasions, 
by legal prohibitions on asset purchases, equity investments, and unsecured lending. 
                                                 
83 Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System 109-10 (2010); David 
Wessel, In Fed We Trust 174-75 (2009). 
84 Wessel, supra, at 21. 
85 Bernanke memoir, at 299. 
86 John Samples, Lawless Policy: TARP as Congressional Failure, 660 Pol. Analysis 1, 4-9 (2010); Charles W. 
Calomiris & Urooj Khan, An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial Institutions, 29 J. Econ Perspectives 53, 
55 n.2 (2015). 
18 
 
 
D. Treasury 
 
 The Fed was not the only government agency that violated the law during the financial 
crisis. Treasury and FDIC did as well. 
 
 During the run on money market mutual funds in September 2008, Treasury 
supplemented the Fed’s rescue efforts by creating an insurance program for money market 
mutual funds. In return for a fee, a fund would receive a Treasury guarantee for its investors.87 
The purpose of this program was to restore confidence in money market mutual funds. The 
Treasury made available $50 billion for this program from the Exchange Stabilization Fund 
(ESF). 
 
 The ESF was created by Congress in 1934 for the purpose of stabilizing foreign exchange 
rates, as the name implies.88 The law empowered the Treasury to do so by giving it the authority 
to buy treasury securities, gold, foreign exchange, “and other instruments of credit and securities 
the Secretary considers necessary.”89 While this language is vague, in context it clearly means 
that if the Secretary believes that Treasury must purchase or sell some other security in order to 
maintain the value of the dollar in terms of gold or foreign currencies, it may do so. 
 
 As far as I know, neither Treasury nor anyone else has offered a legal argument that the 
use of ESF to guarantee money market mutual funds was lawful. Guaranteeing the funds was not 
designed to affect the value of the U.S. dollar. Guaranteeing funds is not the same thing as 
dealing in securities; nor is there any other language in the statute that implies power to 
guarantee money market mutual funds or any other institutions. Nothing in the law authorized 
Treasury to require premiums in return for the guarantee. 
 
 Treasury’s lack of legal power to address the financial crisis led to the enactment of 
EESA. This law put immense resources at Treasury’s disposal, subject to exceptionally broad 
limits. Nonetheless, Treasury violated those limits. The statute authorizes Treasury “to purchase 
… troubled assets from any financial institution.”90 “Troubled assets” are mortgages, mortgage-
related securities, and “any other financial instrument that the Secretary ... determines the 
purchase of which is necessary to promote financial market stability.”91 A “financial institution” 
“means any institution, including, but not limited to, any bank, savings association,” etc.—with a 
list of other standard financial institutions.92 
 
 Treasury violated these limits in two programs. First, in the Homeowner Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP), Treasury attempted to pay loan servicers, investors, and 
homeowner to renegotiate mortgages. Paying a loan servicer to renegotiate a loan is not the same 
                                                 
87 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty Program for Money Market Funds, (Sept. 
19, 2008) http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1147.aspx (last accessed Nov. 25, 2015).  
88 31 U.S.C. § 5302. 
89 Id. 
90 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101(a)(1). 
91 Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101(a)(5). 
92 Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101(a)(9). 
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thing as buying a financial instrument. Although the latter term is not defined in EESA, it can be 
found in other areas of the law. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that: 
 
“Instrument” means a negotiable instrument or any other writing that evidences a right to 
the payment of a monetary obligation, is not itself a security agreement or lease, and is of 
a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any necessary 
indorsement or assignment. The term does not include (i) investment property, (ii) letters 
of credit, or (iii) writings that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a 
credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.93 
 
Courts distill this definition into two elements: (1) a writing that evidences a right to the payment 
of a monetary obligation, (2) of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by 
delivery with any necessary endorsement or assignment.94 
 
 Treasury set up HAMP by creating a model contract entitled, no doubt with the language 
of EESA in mind, the Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument and Servicer Participation 
Agreement.95 Fannie Mae, as financial agent of the United states, was authorized to enter this 
contract with any loan servicer eligible to participate in the program. Under the contract, Fannie 
Mae pays loan servicers to modify mortgage contracts in favor of homeowners, using funds 
made available to Treasury under EESA. In addition, Fannie Mae channels money through the 
loan servicer to homeowners who stay current with HAMP-modified loans and investors whose 
contractual rights are modified.  
 
The contract modification is embodied in a writing but it does not evidence a right to the 
payment of a monetary obligation. Instead, it evidences a right to the modification of mortgages 
held by others. Someone who possesses the Financial Instrument, whether Fannie Mae or a 
transferee, would have no right to obtain money from anyone. In addition, writings evidencing 
rights to loan modifications are not transferred by delivery in the ordinary course of business. 
Such rights may be assigned as part of a contract, but their value is not embodied in a piece of 
paper which is routinely transferred as a way of conveying value, as is the case for checks, 
securities, and other conventional financial instruments. 
 
 The other violation took place during the automaker bailout. In the fall of 2008 and the 
first half of 2009, Treasury used TARP funds to advance loans to GM and Chrysler, which 
ultimately entered bankruptcy and reemerged with stripped-down operations and modified 
                                                 
93 U.C.C., § 9-102(1)(47). Similar definitions can be found in federal law; see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. 731(c)(2)(C); 18 
U.S.C. 514(a)(2). See also United States v. Howick, 263 F.3d 1056 (9th Cir. 2001) (phony Federal Reserve notes are 
fictitious instruments); United States v. Sargent, 504 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 2007) (postage statements are not financial 
instruments). 
94 See, e.g., In re Omega Environmental Inc., 219 F.3d 984, 986 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a certificate of deposit 
is an instrument). See also In re Commercial Money Center, Inc., 392 B.R. 814, 833-34 (Bankr.App.9, 2008) 
(holding that surety bonds are not instruments because they are not transferrable by delivery in the ordinary course 
of business and do not provide for the payment of any sum certain); In re Matter of Newman, 993 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 
1993) (holding that an annuity contract is not an instrument because it is not transferred in the regular course of 
business). 
95 See U.S. Treasury, Commitment to Purchase Financial Instrument, available at 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-
Programs/housing/mha/Documents_Contracts_Agreements/bankunited_Redacted.pdf.  
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capital structures. GM and Chrysler are not financial institutions but ordinary businesses, and 
hence to all appearances beyond the scope of Treasury’s authority under EESA. Treasury noted 
that GM and Chrysler each owned a financial subsidiary, which advanced funds to car buyers, 
but Treasury could have made loans to those subsidiaries without also making loans to the 
holding companies. Treasury also argued that the automakers were interconnected with the 
financial institutions. If Chrysler collapsed, then Chrysler Financial would collapse as well—it 
would not have Chrysler customers to lend to—and the collapse of Chrysler Financial would 
reverberate throughout the financial system, exacerbating the liquidity crisis.96 
  
As far as I am aware, the government never attempted to demonstrate that collapse of 
Chrysler Financial or GM Financial would have caused a systemic failure. By the time of the 
bankruptcies in the late spring of 2009, the immediate threat to the financial system had been 
resolved. If the Secretary’s say-so was entitled to deference, as one court concluded,97 then the 
restriction to financial institutions in the statute would have been meaningless, since all 
businesses are connected to the financial system.98 In bankruptcy, the government used its power 
as debtor-in-possession financer to manipulate payoffs, ensuring that lower-priority but 
politically connected groups like auto workers were paid more than secured creditors and equal-
priority unsecured creditors. While courts ultimately approved the bankruptcy outcomes (with 
some litigation pending99), scholars have persuasively argued that the wealth transfers that took 
place through the bankruptcy process violated bankruptcy law.100 
 
E. FDIC 
 
 During the crisis, FDIC went well beyond its normal role of providing insurance to bank 
depositors. In October 2008, it created the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP).101 
The TLGP was composed of two pieces: a Debt Guarantee Program (DGP) and a Transaction 
Account Guarantee (TAG). Under the DGP, banks paid a fee to the FDIC fund in return for 
guarantees of new unsecured debt. Under the TAG, banks could pay for the extension of deposit 
insurance to non-interest bearing accounts greater than $250,000, that is, beyond the then-
existing limit of deposit insurance (which had been raised from $100,000 on October 3, 2008102). 
TAG was designed to deter large depositors like businesses from withdrawing funds from 
demand deposit accounts, while DGP enabled banks to raise more funds if withdrawals 
nonetheless occurred.103 The programs were made available not only to insured banks, but to 
bank holding companies and bank affiliates that are not entitled to ordinary FDIC deposit 
insurance. 
                                                 
96 Chrysler II, 576 F.3d 108, 122 n.13 (2d Cir. 2009). 
97 In re Motors II, 430 B.R. 65, 94 (2d Cir. 2010). 
98 Challenges to the Treasury’s authority were dismissed on grounds of standing in In re Motors II, 430 B.R. 65; 
Chrysler II, 576 F.3d 108. 
99 A&D Auto Sales, Inc. v. U.S., 748 F.3d 1142 (Fed.Cir. 2014). 
100 Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 727 (2010); Douglas G. 
Baird, Lessons from the Automobile Reorganizations, 4 J. Legal Analysis 291 (2012). 
101 See GAO report for a description; http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303248.pdf 
102 Press Release, FDIC, Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 Temporarily Increases Basic FDIC 
Insurance Coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 Per Depositor (Oct. 7, 2008) (on file with author). 
https://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10161.html.  
103 For a description of the programs, see GAO, http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303248.pdf. 
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 FDIC claimed authority for TLGP under section 13(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Act.104 The law authorizes FDIC “to make loans to, to make deposits in, to purchase the assets or 
securities of, to assume the liabilities of, or to make contributions to, any insured depository 
institution” in order to prevent it from defaulting; to restore it to normal operation; or to prevent 
it from taking down other banks, “when severe financial conditions exist,” if the collapse of 
those other banks would threaten the FDIC fund.105 Other provisions dictate that FDIC must 
satisfy “least-cost requirements,” meaning that it must use the least costly method of helping a 
bank, and should not benefit uninsured creditors, shareholders, and affiliates of the bank in 
question.106 
 
 The key provision in section 13(c) creates an exception in the case of systemic risk. If 
various procedural hurdles are satisfied, and Treasury (in consultation with the president) 
determines that compliance with the least-cost requirements “would have serious adverse effects 
on economic conditions or financial stability,” then FDIC “may take other action or provide 
assistance under this section as necessary to avoid or mitigate such effects.”107 The underlined 
language is key. The most natural reading is that FDIC may (1) take other action under this 
section, or (2) provide assistance under this section. The FDIC can use only the powers it has 
under the section—to lend, to buy assets, to monitor, and so on—but it can use them, when 
systemic risk exists, to help banks and counterparties who would otherwise be denied help 
because they do not have FDIC insurance. 
 
FDIC’s position, as summarized by the GAO, is that when the systemic risk exception is 
triggered, FDIC’s power to “take other action or provide assistance under this section as 
necessary to avoid or mitigate such effects” permits it to engage in any action—whether or not 
listed in the statute—as long as the action would mitigate systemic risk. FDIC reads the language 
to create two powers: “to take other action” of any type, and “to provide assistance under this 
section.” If systemic risk exists, FDIC may invoke its statutory powers (“provide assistance 
under this section) or—do anything.108 
 
 This is a stretch. The interpretation renders the phrase “provide assistance under this 
section” meaningless because it is fully encompassed by “other action.” The language “under 
this section” refers back to both “other action” and “provide assistance,” confining the 
action/assistance powers to those that FDIC already possesses under the statute or closely related 
to them—the only purpose of the section being to eliminate the least-cost requirements when the 
entire banking system is at stake. FDIC’s interpretation converts FDIC into a general lender of 
last resort that can rescue any company, not just a bank. However, Congress saw FDIC as 
foremost a preserver of the deposit insurance fund and supervisor of banks, and in 1991 added 
language to FDIC’s authorizing statute to encourage it to spend as little money rescuing banks as 
possible.109 If a systemic crisis occurs, FDIC may rescue a bank in the non-least-cost-way—for 
                                                 
104 See GAO’s thorough and valuable discussion of legal issues in http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303248.pdf, 
Appendix II. 
105 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(1)(A)-(C). 
106 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4). 
107 12 U.S.C. § 13(c)(4)(G) (emphasis added). 
108 Id. at 50. 
109 GAO, supra. 
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example, by paying off creditors who are not covered by deposit insurance, or keeping a bank 
temporarily alive when it is insolvent—when nonpayment of creditors or the bank’s failure 
would threaten the system. By contrast, under the TGLP, FDIC offered insurance beyond the 
regular FDIC insurance program to banks that were not under threat of collapse and that were not 
determined to be systemically important, and to nonbanks as well.110 
 
 FDIC also violated the law through its participation in the public-private investment 
program, an initiative from Treasury that enabled private entities and Treasury to jointly buy 
toxic loans and toxic securities from banks.111 FDIC facilitated this program by insuring the debt 
issued by Public-Private Investment Funds (PPIF), which were supplied by equity capital from 
Treasury and private investors. PPIFs would buy undervalued mortgages from banks, and either 
hold them to maturity or sell them after their prices recovered. The debt, secured by the 
mortgages, would be paid off first, with the balance going to the investors, as usual. FDIC relied 
on the systemic-risk trigger in its statute. Under its interpretation, the PPIF guarantees certainly 
qualified as “other actions,” and other actions that plausibility mitigate systemic risk. Under the 
more plausible interpretation of the statute, the PPIF guarantees were illegal because they were 
not issued to banks. They were issued to funds or trusts, which were effectively hedge funds, not 
depository institutions.112  
 
F. The Problem of Administrative Structure 
 
 Divisions among agencies prevented a unified response to the financial crisis to an extent 
that has not been appreciated. Before the crisis, two major agencies stood ready to provide 
emergency liquidity support: the Fed and FDIC. As we have seen, the Fed was authorized to 
make emergency secured loans, both to banks and non-banks. FDIC was authorized to make 
emergency loans to—and also to engage in other transactions with, like buying assets from—
banks alone. In addition, FDIC’s authority was limited to addressing undercapitalized or 
insolvent banks, while the Fed’s authority—at least, by custom—was limited to helping solvent 
institutions. 
 
 Treasury had no standing rescue authority—putting aside the ESF, which was clearly not 
intended for financial-crisis rescue purposes—but EESA placed $700 billion at the disposal of 
Treasury once the crisis began, funds that Treasury was authorized to use to help any financial 
institution—by buying assets, making loans, and acquiring equity. Even after Treasury received 
these funds, the Fed and FDIC continued to play extremely important roles in the rescue, as we 
have seen. 
 
 While all of the agencies were designed to play a role in rescuing the financial system, 
their roles—and hence their missions—differed. Sheila Bair, for example, saw her primary job as 
ensuring that the FDIC fund was not depleted, so that insured depositors would be protected. 
Bernanke, Geithner, and Paulson believed that she put the fund’s solvency over the health of the 
financial system. Indeed, by insisting that the fun pay out only those with insurance, Bernanke 
                                                 
110 For a discussion, see GAO, supra. 
111 Press Release, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Public-Private Investment Program (March 23, 2009), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/ppip_whitepaper_032309.pdf. 
112 For a discussion of the legal debate, see Wallach, supra note __, at 152-53. 
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and the others believed that Bair was putting the fund at greater risk because if the shadow 
banking system collapsed, depositors would run on banks, destroying the FDIC fund. They tried 
to persuade her to make the FDIC guarantee more broadly available. Although Bair eventually 
agreed, authorizing FDIC’s participation in the TGLP and the PPIP, she did so only after delay 
and friction. 
 
 Bernanke saw the Fed as the ultimate LLR, but he also defined its role in narrower terms 
than he might have. The Fed traditionally earns financial returns through its operations, and 
every year turns over its “profits” (revenues minus operating expenses) to Treasury. As the 
financial crisis unfolded, Bernanke began to fear that those profits might be reduced to zero.113 
He believed that if the Fed turned over no money to Treasury—or lost money—the political 
repercussions would be severe. This explains why Bernanke frequently interpreted 13(3) to mean 
that the Fed could lend only to solvent institutions, while 13(3) is not so limited; and why 
Bernanke on several occasions obtained letters from Paulson that verified that a particular 
lending program might lose money.114 The letters were not legally required, but would provide 
political cover in the case of a loss. Bernanke’s concerns help explain why he refused to rescue 
Lehman—which he believed was insolvent—and why he told Paulson that it would be necessary 
to go to Congress for additional money. 
 
 Treasury is, by custom, the fiscal authority. With congressional authorization, it spends 
the government’s money. That is why Paulson took the lead negotiating with Congress for 
EESA, and why EESA authorized spending through Treasury. And this is why Bernanke asked 
Paulson to write letters supporting several Fed programs that could have produced losses for 
Treasury. Treasury was allowed, through EESA, to make risky investments and buy risky assets, 
and thus was permitted to take losses. 
 
 As a non-independent agency under the direct supervision of the president, Treasury is 
also a more “political” agency than the Fed and FDIC—that is, more sensitive to popular opinion 
as channeled through the presidency than the Fed and FDIC, whose major concern is to retain 
their legitimacy with Congress. This, too, was reflected in its actions. Paulson (and later 
Geithner) regularly consulted with the president and Congress. Paulson, stung by the negative 
reaction to the Bear rescue, and philosophically opposed to intervening in markets, was initially 
more cautious about bailouts than the Fed.115 Geithner, once in office, found himself under 
pressure from Congress and the president’s supporters to use TARP funds on foreclosure relief, 
despite his doubts about its effectiveness.116 By contrast, the Fed and FDIC showed little interest 
in this issue.117 
 
 While the Fed, Treasury, and FDIC were the main players, they needed to contend with 
numerous other agencies with authority over other pieces of the financial system. The Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) were the 
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115 See supra. 
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primary regulators of the national banks and the federal savings & loans. These agencies lacked 
LLR authority but nonetheless tried to protect the institutions they regulated from shut-downs, 
and in general acted as nuisances. The SEC used its emergency powers to implement a 
temporary short-sale ban—apparently, at the behest of the Fed and Treasury—and otherwise did 
little of value.118 The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) operated the conservatorships of 
Fannie and Freddie; Geithner would later complain that it obstructed efforts to revive the 
mortgage market.119 
 
 The division of authority led to frictions even among the primary LLR agencies. 
Wachovia, a giant national bank, was on the verge of collapse in September 2008. The 
government helped broker a deal in which Citigroup would acquire Wachovia with government 
support. Before the merger was completed, Wells Fargo made a more attractive bid for 
Wachovia. Geithner believed that FDIC should block or discourage Wells Fargo’s bid, but Bair 
allowed it to go through, in part because Wells Fargo was financially healthier than Citigroup. 
She feared that Citigroup would choke on Wachovia, exposing FDIC’s insurance fund to 
massive liabilities. Geithner was infuriated by Bair’s stance. He believed that the government’s 
credibility was at stake, but the real source of disagreement appears to be that Geithner wanted to 
help Citigroup, which would have benefited from Wachovia’s deposit base.120 
 
 This episode can be read in two ways—as a good-faith disagreement about the proper 
crisis response, and as a clash between bureaucratic missions. Under the former interpretation, 
the agencies disagreed about timing and tactics: whether to provide assistance to Citigroup by 
favoring it over Wells Fargo even though Wells Fargo offered the better deal, or to provide 
assistance to Citigroup later through a direct infusion of funds (as happened). Bair believed that 
the latter approach was more transparent and fairer; Geithner believed that the press of events did 
not allow for it. As a bureaucratic clash, the dispute can be seen as one in which each agency 
favored its turf. FDIC sought to preserve the bank insurance fund. Geithner sought to protect a 
major bank with which the FRBNY had a close relationship. 
 
 Another dispute occurred over Lehman. Among the principals, Geithner was the most 
anxious to save Lehman—and, in general, the most aggressive about bailing out firms. Paulson 
was most reluctant. Bernanke was in the middle. An explanation for this division was that 
Paulson was the most politically accountable—and the public mood at that time was decisively 
opposed to bailouts. Bernanke also worried about the public’s and Congress’ suspicion of the 
Fed, and sought to avoid a transaction in which the Fed lost money. Geithner, while also a Fed 
employee, was not as central a figure, and was freer to act on his judgment as to what was best 
for the financial system. 
 
 All that said, the initial reactions to the bailouts showed more consensus than 
disagreement among the three LLR agencies. This probably reflected their relative political 
                                                 
118 It was also asked to relax mark-to-market accounting standards but refrained from doing so, instead issuing an 
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crises. For a discussion, see Christian Laux & Christian Leuz, Did Fair-Value Accounting Contribute to the 
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insulation. Even Paulson was protected by Bush’s lame-duck status. By contrast, Congress could 
not avoid politics. Members of Congress, unlike President Bush, faced reelection campaigns in 
November 2008. By the time of EESA, much of the public had come round to bailouts, but 
intense dissent remained, and EESA was initially voted down in the House. It was eventually 
passed only after $150 billion of pork had been added to the Senate version of the bill.121 The 
many payoffs—such as the repeal of an excise tax on toy arrows122—were transparent interest-
group transfers that were unrelated to the policy questions raised by the law. The substantive 
provisions of EESA reflected the influence of the finance industry. Mian et al. find a statistically 
significant correlation between campaign contributions from Wall Street and an elected official’s 
vote in favor of EESA.123  
 
 After EESA was enacted, politically connected firms—defined in various ways, including 
firms with directors who worked for a banking regulator or Treasury—were more likely to 
receive TARP funds than other firms.124 There is also evidence that investors in firms with 
political connections to Geithner expected those firms to benefit when Geithner was appointed 
Treasury Secretary.125 
 
 The political economy of the crisis response is too complex to allow for simple 
conclusions, and requires more study. But this much seems to be clear. Congress was more 
responsive to public opinion than the agencies, and Treasury was more responsive to public 
opinion than the Fed and FDIC. Congress had a less sophisticated understanding of the crisis; 
and Congress, as always, was both slower and more transparent than the agencies. But the 
influence of interest-group pressures is difficult to untangle: was Congress more heavily 
influenced by them than the agencies were, or not? A tentative view is that the agencies reacted 
more quickly and more as technocratic experts than Congress did, but were also influenced by 
narrow bureaucratic missions as well as complex interest-group pressures. 
 
G. Conclusion: Gaps in the Rescue Agencies’ Authority 
 
 The crisis response was hampered by gaps in the government’s powers. While EESA 
closed some of these gaps, the involvement of Congress in the midst of a crisis created problems 
of its own. There was not enough time for members of Congress to educate themselves about the 
crisis and to deliberate about it. Election-year politics also interfered with deliberation; experts 
outside the government, whose testimony would have normally been sought, were excluded from 
participation by Democrats who, according to a pair of authors, wanted to ensure that the public 
                                                 
121 The figure comes from Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage 
Default Crisis, 100 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1967 (2010). 
122 Breakdown of the Final Bailout Bill. Washington Post, Sept 28, 2008 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
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would associate the crisis response with the Bush administration.126 Congress was little more 
than a rubber stamp. 
 
 In sum, the agencies were hampered by their lack of authority to: 
 
• buy assets, including equity.127 
• make unsecured loans to non-bank financial institutions. 
• control non-bank financial institutions to which the Fed made loans, in order to force 
them to pay off counterparties, lend money, and so on. 
• wind up insolvent non-bank financial institutions, including the lack of authority to lend 
to them or counterparties in order to ensure an orderly liquidation. 
• force non-bank financial institutions to raise capital. 
• dictate terms of transactions, control the behavior of firms (for example, forcing them to 
lend), or acquire them where necessary. 
  
In the absence of these authorities, the agencies improvised, but in ways that were far 
from ideal. First, the agencies used veiled threats to force financial institutions to act in needed 
ways. Second, the agencies “regulated by deal”128—effectively, bribing financial institutions to 
act in needed ways. As an illustration of both these points, in order to persuade banks to 
participate in the CPP, Treasury both offered favorable terms129 and issued a veiled threat that 
things would go poorly for banks that did not participate.130 Third, the agencies, in a number of 
instances, simply violated the law—as the Fed did when it acquired equity in AIG and controlled 
its operations. Fourth, the agencies ultimately demanded a law from Congress, which caused 
delay and numerous other problems. Further exacerbating all these problems, the major 
agencies—Treasury, the Fed, and FDIC—failed to coordinate on a number of occasions because 
of conflicting bureaucratic missions as well as good-faith disagreements. 
 
III. Reform 
 
A. Substantive Authorities 
 
 When a tornado, hurricane, or earthquake strikes, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) sends personnel, resources, and money to the affected area, while the police or 
national guard uses emergency authority to keep order. The government is not required to ask 
                                                 
126 See Charles W. Calomiris & Urooj Khan, An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial Institutions, 29 J. 
Econ. Perspectives 53 (2015). 
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128 Steven Davidoff Solomon & David T. Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government’s Response to the Financial 
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Congress for assistance; legal authority to respond to the emergency in all ways necessary is 
already in place. This simple model should guide the design of what I will call the Financial 
Crisis Response Authority (FCRA). 
 
 The FCRA, because of its vast powers, should be permitted to act only after a financial 
crisis has begun. The law should, as now, provide that the FCRA’s authorities are triggered upon 
agreement by a supermajority of top economic officials, including the president. These officials 
should also release a statement that describes objective indicators of crisis, such as a collapse of 
lending or other signs of loss of confidence. 
 
 Once the crisis begins, the FCRA would be able to draw on an unlimited credit line from 
Treasury or on a fund supplied from taxes on all financial institutions, or (best of all) both.131 An 
unlimited credit line would follow the model of the Fed, which can extend credit on its own 
account, enabling the FCRA to borrow enough money to fund its rescue activities, whatever the 
magnitude the crisis. A fund would follow the model of the FDIC, which relies on a fund 
financed by assessments from banks with FDIC insurance. Each approach has different 
advantages. The problem with a fund is that it could run out of money before the crisis has been 
resolved. Congress would need to replenish it, creating the risk of delay or failure to act, which 
would greatly worsen the crisis. In contrast, the FCRA could draw on an unlimited credit line 
indefinitely. 
 
However, a fund might be more politically appealing because it is self-financing. When 
financial institutions receive payouts from a fund financed by their own assessments, there is no 
sense in which they are being “bailout out” by the taxpayer. This is a particular advantage if 
firms are insolvent, and not merely illiquid. During the crisis, the FDIC took much less political 
heat than the Fed, probably for this reason. 
 
However it is funded, the FCRA could use its resources to buy financial assets, including 
notes, loans, bonds, and stock; to make secured and unsecured loans; to purchase and take 
control of financial institutions; and to seize financial institutions under the power of eminent 
domain with just compensation determined by a judicial valuation at a later date. The FCRA 
would also enjoy a separate regulatory or supervisory power, which would enable it to order 
financial institutions to raise capital, to shut down operations, to sell assets, and to borrow 
money; and to ban or regulate market transactions like short sales.132 
 
 The recent financial crisis shows why all these powers are necessary and the conventional 
Bagehot approach is inadequate. Because of the fear of stigma, even liquidity-constrained 
financial institutions will be inclined to delay before borrowing from emergency credit facilities. 
The FCRA needs the authority to force those firms to borrow, and also to force healthy firms to 
borrow at the same time in order to prevent the market from picking off the weakest firm. 
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Moreover, the crisis showed that when financial institutions accept emergency loans, they have 
strong incentives to hoard cash when the system as a whole benefits only if they lend into the 
market a portion of the money they borrow. For this reason, the FCRA needs the authority to 
order firms to enter financial transactions. Finally, the crisis showed that financial institutions 
that should be given emergency money may not be able to offer collateral for a loan, and it may 
be very difficult to value the collateral in any event. The FCRA needs the authority to make 
capital injections, unsecured loans, and partially secured loans; and to buy assets. 
 
 Vast powers create opportunities for abuse; the FCRA cannot be given unlimited power. 
Judicial review during a crisis is impractical, as the 2007-2008 crisis showed. People negatively 
affected by the government’s actions could not persuade courts to intervene.133 Judges are 
unwilling to interfere with emergency actions by expert agencies. Courts move too slowly and 
lack expertise. One court denied relief even after the crisis, explaining that if it did award 
damages to the claimants, then government officials would refuse to take justified risks during 
the next crisis.134 However, this view, if taken to its logical extreme, would eliminate any 
constraint on the government. A robust legal regime to correct abuses after the crisis can be put 
into place. As noted, where the FCRA uses force to acquire firms and other assets, the owners 
will be able to sue the government for damages based on a proper valuation that uses 
fundamental rather than crisis-driven asset values. In addition, where the FCRA uses it 
regulatory and supervisory authorities to order firms to shed assets and make loans, the firms will 
be entitled to sue after the crisis and receive a remedy if they can show that the FCRA’s actions 
were unreasonable. The usual post-crisis analyses by independent government agencies with the 
power to compel testimony and discover documents from the FCRA will facilitate the litigation 
by collecting facts and making them publicly available. 
 
B. Administrative Organization 
 
 The complex division of responsibility between financial regulatory agencies hampered 
the crisis response. How should the FCRA be designed to do better? It is tempting to argue that 
all powers should be handed to it, eliminating at a stroke the problem of interagency rivalries. 
However, it is doubtful that such a powerful agency would be politically acceptable, while 
existing agencies are too deeply entrenched in the government’s institutional structure to be 
swept aside. The Dodd-Frank Act eliminated the Office of Thrift Supervision, but addressed the 
entrenched status of the other agencies by layering a coordinating body, the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) above them.135 The FSOC identifies risks in the financial system, 
identifies systemically risky institutions, and orders the breakup of too-big-to-fail entities, but it 
does not enjoy any rescue authority aside from a coordinating function. 
 
 This seems inadequate, but it is not clear what the alternative is. The problem with the 
existing regulatory structure, revealed by the financial crisis, is that the different agencies 
                                                 
133 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, 
Delaware and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 Emory L. J. 713 (2009). 
134 Starr International Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 906 F.Supp.2d 202, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“tort 
liability for governmental actors is narrowly limited or precluded altogether, in order to give such actors the latitude 
and discretion to do their jobs effectively, including when circumstances are pressing and there is limited time to 
act”). Disclosure: I worked on this case for the plaintiffs. 
135 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 (2010). 
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develop constituencies that they try to protect: for the OCC, big New York banks; for the OTS, 
thrifts; for FDIC, regular banks; for the Fed, big Wall Street financial institutions. FEMA or the 
National Guard does not favor constituencies, but sees its mission as protecting people and 
restoring order.136 It is possible to think that a financial agency could be given a similar purely ex 
post mission, detached from ex ante regulatory responsibilities that might cause it to favor some 
entities over others. But the connection between ex ante regulation and ex post response seems 
necessary to ensure that agencies possess enough information and expertise about the financial 
system to be able to act wisely during a crisis. 
 
If we use history as our guide, the Fed seems to be the agency that shows the least 
favoritism and the most consideration for the general public rather than for specific groups. 
Because of their power over the money supply, central banks are in a better position than other 
agencies to address a financial crisis. This role has been understood for a long time and is central 
to the mission and self-conception of central banks. The Fed already has the broadest powers and 
the greatest level of sophistication among all the financial agencies. While practical and 
institutional constraints cannot be wished away, Congress should gradually transfer additional 
powers to the Fed, such as the power to buy assets, make unsecured loans, and acquire equity, 
while removing LLR powers from other agencies, to the extent politically feasible. 
 
C. Dodd-Frank 
 
 In the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress created a much-needed resolution authority for non-
bank financial firms. It named it the Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) and placed it under 
the control of FDIC.137 But Congress perversely reduced the power of the LLR in three ways. 
First, it amended section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to require that emergency loans take 
place through a “program or facility with broad-based eligibility.”138 This provision was 
intended to ban bailouts similar to those of Bear Stearns and AIG, which were directed to a 
single company rather than a group of companies. By contrast, the many credit facilities were 
open to any company that satisfied certain criteria. Facilities like those would remain lawful 
under the amendment. 
 
 Second, Congress blocked Treasury from using the Exchange Stabilization Fund to 
finance “any future guaranty programs for the United States money market mutual fund 
industry.”139 This was intended to prevent a repeat of the Temporary Guarantee Program, which 
helped end the run of money market mutual funds. 
 
 Third, Congress put constraints on FDIC’s power to offer system-wide guarantees, 
mainly by erecting procedural hurdles and stipulating that the guarantee cannot benefit insolvent 
                                                 
136 This is not to say that these institutions perform blamelessly. FEMA, in particular, has been subject to criticism 
for decades, and has been reorganized numerous times. See Henry B. Hogue & Keith Bea, Cong. Res. Serv., 
RL33369, Federal Emergency Management and Homeland Security Organization: Historical Developments and 
Legislative Options (2006). 
137 12 U.S.C. §§ 5381-5394. 
138 See 12 U.S.C. § 343. In 2015, the Fed adopted regulations implementing the law. David Harrison, Fed Adopts 
Dodd-Frank Bailout Limits, Wall Street Journal, November 30, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-set-to-adopt-
final-emergency-lending-rule-1448889633. 
139 12 USC 5236(b). 
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institutions.140 Congress was apparently reacting to FDIC’s Temporary Liquidity Guarantee 
Program, which, as we saw, may have violated FDIC’s legal authority. 
 
 By placing additional restrictions on the Fed and the other agencies, and placing the OLA 
outside the Fed, Congress weakened the power of the government to address a financial crisis.141 
How much it weakened the government is hard to say. If the last crisis is a guide, agencies will 
be able to coordinate in the major crisis response, and they will read the new restrictions 
narrowly in order to evade them. But Congress missed an opportunity to provide necessary 
additional authority to the LLR and reduce its coordination costs. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The financial crisis exposed significant gaps in the LLR’s authority. While Congress 
filled one gap with the OLA, it perversely widened the others. It should have enhanced the 
powers of the LLR, and gathered as many of those powers as possible into the hands of the Fed, 
subject to a strong procedural trigger that requires consensus among top economic officials and 
the president that a financial crisis had begun. The reason is simple. The LLR powers available 
to the Fed and other agencies reflected a simpler world in which the banking system was the 
primary source of short-term liabilities, so that the FDIC fund plus the Fed’s residual lending 
powers sufficed to stop a crisis, even to prevent a crisis from starting. A new system that extends 
the LLR to the shadow banking system is needed. 
 
 Congress did not create such an LLR for numerous reasons—mostly political reasons, 
including distrust of the Fed, and popular resentment at the bailouts of Wall Street firms. The 
most important policy reason for restricting the LLR is the theory that a generous LLR 
encourages financial institutions to behave recklessly—a theory that was adopted in Dodd-Frank 
itself.142 Economists disagree about whether moral hazard is a significant concern, and I will not 
address this topic here.143 The minimal point is that moral hazard is not a justification for 
depriving the LLR of the powers that it needs to rescue the financial system. The necessity of an 
LLR is (within mainstream economic and political circles) uncontested. And if an LLR is 
necessary, then it should be supplied with the powers that it needs. Moral hazard justifies ex ante 
regulation such as capital requirements, which are independent of the LLR’s power, and 
(conceivably) requirements that the LLR penalize the firms that it rescues—for example, with 
high interest rates, as in the original Bagehot formulation. Both ex ante regulation and ex post 
penalizing are consistent with a powerful and robust LLR. 
 
 As an analogy, imagine that a town is plagued by residential fires, caused by the 
carelessness of homeowners who do not install smoke detectors and store flammable materials in 
their basements. The town could sensibly address this problem by enacting a fire code that it 
enforces with inspections. It could also address this problem by directing the fire department to 
                                                 
140 12 U.S. Code § 5611, 5612. 
141 Interestingly, there is some evidence that the customized rescues created moral hazard while the non-customized 
forms of liquidity support did not. See Yacine Aït-Sahalia, Jochen Andritzky, Andreas Jobst, Sylwia Nowak, Natalia 
Tamirisa, Market Response To Policy Initiatives During The Global Financial Crisis, 87 J. Int’l Econ. 162 (2012). 
However, it does not seem to me that the evidence is strong enough to justify depriving the Fed of this power. 
142 The preamble claims that the Dodd-Frank Act will end bailouts. See PL 111-203, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat 1376. 
143 See citations in supra note __. 
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replace hoses with squirt guns and tanker trucks with horse-drawn carriages. The second 
approach would certainly address moral hazard; residents, fearful that the fire department will 
not save their houses, would be more careful. But not all fires are caused by carelessness, and not 
all careless fires should be allowed to burn since, by a process similar to financial contagion, 
fires may spread from house to house. The town does better with the fire code. And so with the 
LLR. 
 
 Another possible criticism of my proposal is that it would violate the “rule of law.” 
Numerous scholars have argued that the Fed and Treasury violated the rule of law during the 
financial crisis, and many of them also argue that the Fed needs to be stripped of powers so that 
it cannot violate the rule of law again.144 On inspection, it becomes clear that while the authors 
believe (in most cases, correctly) that the Fed violated the law during the crisis, their main 
complaint is that Congress has given the Fed too much discretionary power, which enables it to 
act arbitrarily. However, the constitutional limitations on delegation of power to agencies—
embodied in the nondelegation doctrine—are effectively nil. The requirement that the LLR use 
its powers to unfreeze the financial system145 would supply the intelligible principle required by 
the nondelegation doctrine under recent precedents.146 
 
 A more serious version of this criticism, emphasized by Paul Tucker, is that, as a matter 
of political economy (as opposed to legal principles) an unconstrained central bank is both 
undesirable and unsustainable.147 Undesirable because we live in a democracy, and an 
independent agency with vast powers may act against the will of the people; and unsustainable 
because for just that reason the agency will be regarded with suspicion and ultimately subject to 
constraints.148 Tucker advocates two types of constraints—procedural and substantive. The 
procedural constraints include reporting requirements, triggering rules that require the agreement 
of top officials, and the like. Few people would disagree with such requirements, which are 
mostly in pace. As a substantive constraint, he argues that the LLR should never be allowed to 
lend to insolvent firms because such loans put at risk funds that go to the Treasury, and hence 
raise “fiscal” issues that are the province of Congress and the people. 
 
 Tucker’s worries are well-grounded. The restrictions on the LLR in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
along with routine threats by Congress to impose further restrictions on the Fed, reflect just those 
worries. The problem with his argument is that, as we saw during the financial crisis, lending to 
insolvent firms—or firms that are likely to be insolvent—may well be a sensible approach to a 
crisis. Many such firms often have counterparties that are solvent, and lending to insolvent firms, 
enabling them to pay their counterparties, may be a more efficient way of helping the 
counterparties than lending to them directly. 
                                                 
144 Lawrence H. White, The Federal Reserve and the Rule of Law (2013); John Samples, Lawless Policy (2010); 
Todd Zywicki, The Auto Bailout and the Rule of Law (2011); cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-
Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority: Too Big for the Constitution, 163 U. Penn. L. Rev. 165 (2014) (arguing that 
the OLA is unconstitutional). 
145 And the similar principles that can be found in EESA. 
146 See Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
147 See Tucker, supra. 
148 On congressional efforts to rein in the Fed by requiring it to submit to audits and other requirements, see Sheila 
Tschinkel, Congress Auditing The Federal Reserve Is a Truly Frightening Idea, Quartz (2015), 
http://qz.com/362155/congress-auditing-the-federal-reserve-is-a-truly-frightening-idea/.  
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 While the idea that the LLR should not invade the fiscal province of the legislature has a 
long history, going back to Bagehot and beyond, it is time to retire it. The fiscal versus monetary 
distinction is illusory during a financial crisis. The LLR can value most collateral only with 
difficulty, with the valuation depending on whether or not the crisis conditions will ameliorate in 
the near future. As a result, the LLR’s collateral valuations are based in part on the LLR’s own 
prediction about the effectiveness of its current and future actions, giving it a huge amount of 
effective discretion even under the strict Bagehot approach. Moreover, if the LLR acts weakly 
rather than aggressively, and fails to resolve the crisis, the negative fiscal consequences—lower 
tax receipts, higher transfer payments—would vastly exceed losses on loans made to insolvent 
firms. And if the question is popular legitimacy, the fiscal versus monetary distinction will be 
lost on the public. 
 
 The LLR will be able to survive in a democracy, regardless of how powerful and 
independent it is, as long as the public believes that it serves the public interest. Depriving it of 
the powers it needs can hardly advance that goal. 
